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by Truong Chinh (Dang Xuan Khu)

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The following is a translation of the text of a paper prepared by Truong Chinh (Dang Xuan Khu), key figure in the Indochinese Communist Party (PCI), on the policy and politics of the PCI. Although essentially an overt report on PCI strategy, it is believed of definite significance in view of the open admission of the various strategies used by the PCI in its march to full control of the rebel nationalist regime in Vietnam and the complete tie between the PCI and Soviet foreign policy since the formation of the PCI.

REPORT AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF THE PARTY

(By Comrade Truong Chinh)

- I. Why is it necessary to study the policy of the party?
- II. Significance of the question.
- III. How to determine the direction of party policy.
- IV. The paths of party policy since the founding of the party.
- V. Conclusion.

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- I. Why is it necessary to study the policy of the party?

- a) What does policy mean? Policy means many ideas and plans which the party advocates towards a determined question, or it can include the application of such ideas to direct the party towards the goal of the revolution.
- b) It is necessary to study the policy of the party because the party member who does not know the policy of the party cannot thoroughly follow the correct path.

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II. Significance of the question.

It is not enough to study just the present policy of the party, one must study party policy from the beginning in order to gain from earlier experiences, and know the present facts in order to act under present circumstances. While studying, one must examine all the aspects of a question, and then the particular part which one is supposed to know.

While studying, one must remember that the revolutionary movement has several phases and that each phase includes several periods. In this manner one studies the strategy and the tactics of the party throughout these periods.

In a word, strategy is the means by which victory in war is won or the devices employed by the party during a particular war. Revolution is the strategy devised to combat the enemy. Strategy includes all forms of organization, combat, and propaganda slogans used to attain the aims of this strategy. Revolutionary strategy does not change during the course of a phase. On the other hand, tactics can always change, even from one hour to the next.

III. How does one determine the direction of party policy? One can't stand still and rack his brain to determine the path of the party. One has to be informed, to study the world situation as well as all the aspects of the national situation (political, economic, military). One has to study the strength and capabilities, advantages and disadvantages, to understand the situation and the trends on our side as well as on the enemy's.

To study politics means to study the important maneuvers of different nations of the world, and the power of the parties in a given country.

To study economics means to study the means of production and distribution.

To study sociology means to study class differences, and the inclinations and hopes of each class.

To study civilizations means to study the plausibility of current ideas, and the degree of compatibility of such ideas with the customs and habits of the people.

To study profits and losses means to study the strong and weak points.

To study strength and capabilities means to find out our own strength and that of the enemy.

One studies the world situation in order to know how events influence us. To study the enemy is to know where our principal enemy is, and where our direct and indirect allies are. Our allies are the people's classes and the revolutionary movements of the whole world. Our indirect allies are the disagreements among the colonialists, between the colonialists and the traitors, and among the traitors themselves. These allies are an important force because we cannot fight the enemy alone. Beside us there will be the direct and indirect forces which will help us to fight our enemy.

It must be remembered that the indirect allies are very important, sometimes even more important than the direct allies. During the second world war, for example, the disagreements between the fascists and the capitalists of the world were the most useful indirect allies for our revolution.

IV. The political path of our party since its founding.

Let us study the policy of our party throughout 5 periods:

- a. the first was the period of formation and of the anti-colonialist, anti-feudalist proclamation (1921-1931).

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- b) the second was one of revolutionary retirement (1931-1935).
- c) the third was the period of the people (1936-1939).
- d) the fourth was the period of the second World War, of anti-fascism. (1939-1945).
- e) the fifth period was that of the August Revolution and of the resistance.

Throughout these five periods, the revolution in Indochina has remained in the period of the anti-capitalistic democratic revolution.

a. The First Period.

1. Unification of the Communist group: the popular movement in North Vietnam was rather strong in 1929, and the proletarians united. The proletarian movement became the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League. Then it was decided to dissolve this union in order to found the Communist Party, but this was not approved by the assembly. Consequently the comrades in the north founded the Indochinese Communist Party, the comrades in the Central region, the Communist Alliance, and the comrades in the south, the Annamese Communist Party.

On 6 January 1929, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) called a general assembly at the end of which the Communist Party of Indochina was founded. Later on, it was called the Indochinese Communist Party.

The policy of the party after it was united: After its unification, the party acted as one unit, but it was not until October 1930 that this was brought out in the open.

Comrade Tran Phu drafted a report which was discussed throughout the party. This was the report on the Anti-Capitalistic Democratic Revolution. The report stresses these points:

Indochina has only a few light industries and no heavy industry at all. Feudal traces are still abundant, and therefore colonialism and feudalism must be destroyed.

All the classes in Indochina, except the feudalistic class, unanimously approve of the revolution, and therefore a united anti-colonialist front must be founded to draw the compatriots under the leadership of the proletarian class.

This front was finally called the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist Alliance. The slogans used were : Down with Imperialism and Feudalism. Establish a Soviet government, with artisan-peasant and military participation.

Indochina must be completely independent.

Establish a Communist artisan-peasant army.

Confiscate foreign holdings and put them under government management.

Confiscate the land of the owners and return it to the peasants.

Eight hour work day.

Establish taxes to have revenue. Establish work relief.

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Right of nations to self-determination.

Equal rights for men and women.

Compulsory education.

Support the USSR.

Next to these major slogans, the party also had small slogans such as:

Increase in wages-Shorter hours-Abolish corporal punishment-Accident compensation - etc.

In this way the party consolidated the general slogans with the scattered ones, and defended everyday interests to win over the population. The movements expanded from North to South, and those people who attained these common rights had absolute confidence in the party. The struggle of our fellow-countrymen of Nghe An-Ha Tinh was especially heroic. Nghe An-Ha Tinh had experienced heavy rains which caused a loss of harvests; not only were its people helpless, but they also had to pay heavy taxes. Consequently the people rose in anger to struggle to the bitter end. The delegations of Thanh Cuong, Nam Dan, Huong Son, had established a Soviet government.

3. The imperialist repression and the regression of the movement.

Towards the end of 1931 the movement started to decline because of intense imperialistic repressions. The Central Committee of the South and the Regional Committee in the North were broken up. The strength of the party was diminished.

4. General recapitulation.

Globally the policy was right but its implementation was frustrated due to lack of leadership for the people and lack of reasoning. The proof of this narrowness can be seen in the failure of the Nghe An-Ha Tinh insurrectionists to affiliate with progressive organs and to incorporate them into their front. When the power of the Soviets was established, they did not know how to organize guerrillas to amplify the struggle. It was lack of organization and technique for keeping the cadres in the ranks of the people.

5. Experience.

One must always keep sight of the enemy and single him out, otherwise one exposes oneself to narrowness and failure. One must know how to create a solid and broad front which could unite all the revolutionary anti-imperialists and anti-feudalist forces under the direction of the party in order to fight imperialism and the feudal regime.

To rise and take over power, one must be thoroughly prepared. If the enemy is strong and in control of the cities, only the peasants should rise, and the local uprising should be converted into guerrilla activity and be developed, otherwise one would certainly be surrounded by enemy forces arriving from the cities and the surroundings.

One should only rise when the enemy is undecided and when the population is set on participating in the revolution and supporting the shock troops.

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During the repression one has to be able to organize very scientifically in order to keep up the ranks.

Effort and struggle go together. At the height of the struggle in 1930-1931 the three regions joined in the fight, but paid no attention to their organization, and this caused their failure.

When the movement starts to recede, the party has to know how to protect the partisans, because the life of the movement depends to a great extent on its members. To protect the members is of primary importance in the proletarian revolution.

b. Second period - Recession

1. The decline of the movement: Towards the middle of 1931 there was a let-down in the activities of the party, the French having scored a semi-victory in their policy of strangling the movement. As a result, the offices of the people and the party no longer had any people to hold meetings or to get in touch with each other. The organizations were suspicious and did not dare to contact one another.

The French repression was savage. In the South there was a pretense of justice, because the South had a regime and colonial laws. But in the Central and the North regions, the repressions were like those of the Fascists. They established criminal tribunals there in order to condemn the soldiers of the revolution.

2. Period of Rise.

The period of repression did not mitigate the fighting spirit of the Communists. Our comrades continued to organize in prison; to fight, to seek contact with the outside. The comrades who were free continued to act secretly among the masses. Some of the comrades disappeared to reorganize the action offices (sic) and to get together with the comrades outside. Thanks to that, the movement started to rise again in 1935, beginning with battles in factories, in cities, fighting the transfer of coolies to the upper regions, fighting market taxes and licences. The movement had reunited the peasant classes, workers, merchants, although not in very large numbers.

Comrades returning from foreign countries (Siam, China) organized offices at Lang Son, Cao Bang, and along the Mekong. Comrades in the South and Center, having served their prison terms, went back and reorganized in rural areas. Comrades Nguyen Van Tao and Duong Bach Mai returned in 1934 from France and cooperated with the agents of the Fourth International in editing the paper The Struggle, tying up the struggle through the press with that of the people. Besides this there were activities leading to the election of representatives of the workers and of the people to the Colonial Council, in order to benefit from public representation, and thus helping the aims of the people and beating off colonialism.

3. Big meeting at Macao.

The party held a meeting at the end of 1935 in Macao, China. Comrades Nguyen Ai Quoc and Le Hong Phong were busy and could not attend. The meeting consisted of Vietnamese Communists and a small number of members from Siam and China.

When Comrade Le Hong Phong came back and presented the decisions of the Communist International, one realized that the party policy had been altogether wrong. The International stressed that the enemy in view was Fascism and not Imperialism; that the ally of the proletariat was the petty capitalist in the cities, the peasants, oppressed peoples, and possibly a part of Imperialism that was against the Fascism, and against war. Consequently the policy of the party was changed accordingly.

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Comrades Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap then called a meeting of the members to alter the decisions reached at the first big meeting and revise them to the policy of the people's period.

Experience of the second period.

The Indochinese and the World Revolution are closely related. The Indochinese Revolution became part of the World Revolution and of world wide activity in view of the anti-Fascist war, and because the enemy of the Indochinese Revolution was no longer the same as before. Therefore it became necessary to follow global tendencies as well as the interior situation.

When the movement declined the party had to change its tactics in a suitable fashion, protect its ranks to continue the struggle, and remain in touch with the people.

The party already knew how to exploit the press in order to carry out the struggle for the benefit of the people.

The moment the movement had its recession, the people became discouraged. In such a case the party must glue itself to the people and direct them, to save the real interests and at the same time reform the movement.

In the period of recession of the movement, the party should exploit all the resources of the situation on the outside, in order to reunite all the revolutionary forces and form the movement in the interior.

- c. The third period. People's period of Democratic action 1935-1939.
1. The principal enemy. Our principal enemy was the French reactionary colonialists who were servants of the French "TRUST" (200 French families). These had common interests with world Fascism. The French people's front was created to fight the French colonialists.
 2. The secondary enemy: the traitors, the ranks of the local reactionaries, servants of the colonialists.
 3. The enemy could be Fascist Japan, which at that time had the intention to conquer Indochina.
 4. The allies were the Indochina proletariat, the petty capitalists in the cities, the progressive capitalists of the country, the small land-owners and the French people's front.
 5. The indirect allies were: disagreement among the French colonialists, contradictions between the Democratic and Fascist parties of the world.

Policy: On its highest level the policy of the people's epoch was the establishment of the Indochinese Democratic Front in order to fight the colonialists and the traitors serving them. The front included all the classes of the people and the progressive groups in Indochina, including the French.

At this moment the party did not come out with the slogan: "Independence for Indochina", but instead came out with a slogan which aimed at the return of Democratic freedoms and basic rights:

Down with the reactionary colonialists, servants of the 200

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French families.

We protest against warlike fascism.

Long live the French people's front.

Food, clothing, freedom, peace.

Democratic freedom, freedom for trade unions.

Enlarge the representation of the people.

Freedom for political prisoners.

Down with corrupt officials.

Land reform.

Down with usury.

Down with taxes and dues.

No more illiterates.

Towards the end of 1938 Japan attempted to take over Indochina. The party came out with the slogan--Conditional defense of Indochina.

Period of struggle.

During the people's epoch the party directed the struggle with great zeal. Demonstrations of the people, such as never before seen in Indochina, attracted nearly half a million people in the north and south. The comrades who were elected through the government of the people actively directed the activities, if not officially, at least by supporting them under cover. Our comrades depended equally on the official press and all official organizations connected with the struggle.

The party was really in a hostile state, with public demonstrations and campaigns forming a common front with the activities of the press and assemblies.

There are intangible but powerful forms of struggle, like the protests and will of the people. Such was the movement for representation of Indochina in the people's government in France.

Experience.

1. Our party always distinguished between the primary and secondary enemy; between the urgent responsibilities and those of the whole revolutionary period. The party must know how to arrange its revolutionary forces to upset the enemy and rally all the sympathizers on its side. During the people's period, the party acted in this sense, which explains its success.
2. While participating with other parties on the same front it is understood that, although tolerance is permissible, it should be just. At the same time it is mandatory that our party closely guard its organization and its viewpoint regarding class differences, and also disseminate its view to the rightists and leftists among our allies. Neither must we stop propagandizing for our own doctrine.

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3. The party must also know how to discern in a given situation or circumstances what can be immediately realized, and what can't; what is required for immediate realization, and after the first step is made to proceed to the second.

During the people's period, that which was immediately realizable were the democratic freedoms; that which was not was the slogan "independence". For a long time we have lived subjected to imprisonment and massacre. Consequently we must obtain necessary liberties first of all, and hang on to them to wake up the people.

4. The party know how to take essential advantages which presented themselves, and how to enlarge the ranks and march straight ahead with the populace. It has known how to lead the non-organized population from an inferior fighting organization to a superior unit.

The party must know how to combine secret with overt activities. During the latter, it must always hold back some of the secret members. If the party finds out that the advantages of an open struggle no longer apply, it must reverse itself immediately to clandestine struggle, making sure that the cadre agents are well protected from capture.

During the people's period the party incessantly organized the workers unions while at the same time it organized secretly. Thus, when Daladier signed the Munich pact with Hitler, the party immediately prepared to go under cover. It sent agents to the rural areas to establish bases there.

5. The party comes suddenly out in the open to oppose evil trends; a very rare and isolated occasion.
6. During the people's period, the deficient aspect of the party consisted in its excessive display of confidence in the people's front, to the point of forgetting the question of independence. It is true that the party no longer could come out with the slogan of "complete independence", yet it should have been pointed out in the party program.
7. The movement for increased Indochinese representation failed, partly because of French repression, but also because of the failure of the party to organize a front composed of progressive capitalists. Our too numerous demands intimidated the important intellectuals and the big land-owners.
8. The alliance with the partisans of the 4th International from 1934 until 1936 through the press (The Struggle) was understandable in view of their good faith. But since the Moscow trials it became evident that these latter were provocative agents for the imperialists, so that a prolonged alliance with them was against all principles, especially since the party had sufficient means for itself.

- d. Second period of struggle with the French-Japanese Fascism from 1939-1945.

After the Munich pact France changed its policy, opposing the workers and dissolving the people's front. War broke out with the Germans outside of the country, yet France did not stop oppressing the workers at home, or the population in the colonies.

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The war between England, France, Germany and Italy was an imperialist war, so the party approved none of it.

The Central Committee met in Cochinchina and decided:

To protest against the policy of imperialist war.

To establish a people's front against French imperialism.

The party did not utilize the slogan of land seizure in order to rally the landowners to the ranks of the oppressed peoples; on the contrary, the party made use of the slogan of anti-repression and the one of the struggle of the masses. After the strike of the workers at Gia Lam, the movement fell off somewhat. Nevertheless, one month later France capitulated, and in June the Japanese landed in Indochina. They attacked Lang Son, where the French were beaten and withdrew to Bac Kan. In the meantime the regional committee led the insurrection at Vu Lang. The French opened the door for the Japanese and returned to oppress the movement at Bac Kan - Lang Son. This was during the 7th central meeting of the party. Seeing that the movement in Bac Kan - Lang Son stood little chance to continue, the party decided to prepare for a general uprising in order to preserve the guerrilla forces in Bac Kan - Lang Son for a future action. The assembly dispatched a messenger to bring this decision to the South Vietnam section. But it was too late, the order for the general uprising had been given, and subsequently forty insurrections took place with the military comrades joining enthusiastically. The French took counter-measures. The troops in Saigon were disarmed while the insurrectionists at Gia Dinh, Soc Trang and Tra Vinh were ferociously suppressed. Some of the soldiers retreated into the woods and continued their activities for a while. The militiamen of Sgt. Cung rose at Cao Bang; in January 1941 he started at Do Luong, took it, and then came down to Thanh Vinh. Not knowing how to fight guerrilla style, his insurrection was soon subdued. The party gained many experiences, and on the 8th meeting, called by Nguyen Ai Quoc, it was proclaimed that the Viet Nam revolution is a revolution of the people's liberation.

So instead of the slogan of land partition it was opportune to ally with the landowners and to lead them to the National Union Front against France and Japan.

The National Union Front called itself: Union of Allies for the Independence of Viet Nam.

Its purposes were to support the USSR in case of attack, and to participate in the anti-fascist struggle.

The central committee was just about to close the plenary session when it got news of the attack on the USSR. The circular pledging support of the USSR was immediately brought out.

Guerrilla action broke out again in August 1941 at Bac Kan - Lang Son. The French forced the population to turn over their harvest to prevent them from supplying the guerrillas.

Hostilities in the Pacific broke out in December 1941, when the Japanese decided on the invasion of the colonies held by the imperialist powers in Southeast Asia.

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The permanent commission of the Central Committee recognized in February 1943 that:

The nature of the hostilities going on in the world showed but too clearly that with the participation of the USSR, anti-Fascist and pro-USSR wars were wars of progress, whereas any other war is pro-Fascist and in the path of reaction. It thus became important to voice opposition to the Pacific war.

There were two kinds of Fascist groups in Indochina, the French and the Japanese, while another group of French Democrats sought allies against the Japanese.

Comrade Van brought us armed propaganda units from Viet Minh liberation troops in March 1945 to attack Bac Kan. At this time our group and some French military joined into what was called the "United French Vietnamese Committee". A short time afterwards this same group of Frenchmen fled into China and left us alone to fight the Japanese, leaving us some arms.

Although the revolution in Indochina was to be a revolution liberating the people, it remained essentially tied to capitalism. French policy during 1941-1945 was aimed at dissipating the doctrine of the party. Nevertheless, thanks to its scientific organization, the first organ of the revolution, as well as the one of the people, remained firm.

The circulars of the Central Committee specifically recommended that enrollment be made with utmost prudence so as to protect the work of the party compartmentalization. Constant watch over the ranks is of vital importance to the party. After the open struggle comes to an end, it has been found through experience that principles should be kept secret. Respect the rules of the party.

After 1944 the party tied itself to the group of Duong Duc Hien students and founded the "Democratic Party of Viet Nam" in order to divide the pro-Japanese intellectuals and win them over to the VM front.

After 1944 the party made contact with the social-communist group at Hanoi. Communist groups succeeded in being established in the Legion army, and the party made use of these intermediaries with the De Gaulle group.

In November 1944 the party realized that the Japanese would attack Indochina before long and proposed to the French Democratic group that they unite in a common struggle against the Japanese. Through the intermediary of the social-communist group the party made the following proposals to the De Gaulle group for a common struggle:

Advocate the cessation of harvest storage.

Advocate the liberation of political prisoners.

Supply arms to the Viet Minh to fight the Japanese.

The French rejected the third condition, promising to fulfill the others. Shortly afterwards 136 political

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prisoners were released in Hanoi, and some ten in Hoa Binh. It turned out that these had but light sentences to serve anyway, and the storage of troops continued.

Pre-insurrection period.

9 March 1945 - The French and the Japanese were fighting this very night. The permanent commission of the Central Committee met to decide on its stand and concluded that the Japanese would come out on top, but would be defeated in the near future.

Our principal enemy after the coup d'etat was still the Japanese, and consequently one could unite with any French group whatever in the fight against the Japanese.

The permanent commission also decided to establish regional committees to prepare for the general uprising. The strategic and tactical directives were changed accordingly. The security organizations increased, the army organizations multiplied everywhere to assassinate traitors and Japanese officers. Even in the heart of the cities our agents directed the destruction of rice warehouses, while our units, equipped with propaganda, showed up all over and prevented the storage of rice and helped the population overcome famine. All these forms of battle led the population progressively towards an armed insurrection. The official propaganda slogans went accordingly.

At a military revolutionary meeting in April 1945 it was decided:

- to unite the two armies (Liberation and Youth Liberation army).
- to prepare for the general uprising.
- to establish a government of the liberated zones.
- to develop guerrilla warfare.

The meeting also decided on a general session in August, the time of the general uprising, as well as for the extraordinary session at Tan Trao for the establishment of a provisional government under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh.

The news of the Japanese defeat came just as the party members were preparing for a plenary session. It came so suddenly that many of them stopped right in the middle of the session.

In several places the uprising started upon the receipt of the news about the Japanese surrender, although a number of them had not yet received the circular from the permanent commission. Despite this, they acted on time, holding themselves to the directives of 12 March 1945 issued by the permanent commission. The uprising spread throughout the country, not by an automatic reaction of the people, but under the open or camouflaged leadership of the party.

The slogans for this period were:

- Down with French-Japanese Fascism.
- Complete independence for Indochina.

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Establish the Democratic Republican Union of Indochina.

Set up the People's Government according to the essence of the new democracy.

Confiscate the lands and property of the imperialists and traitors.

Lower the agricultural taxes and rates of interests on loans.

Establish social security.

The right of self-determination for the people.

Equal rights between men and women.

Erase illiteracy and provide for compulsory education up to elementary school.

Establish the Viet Nam Liberation army.

Support the U.S.R. resistance.

Besides the above mentioned slogans the party also had others which were more realistic and temporary.

Down with oppression.

Resist the storage of rice.

Oppose the control of trading and the excessive market taxes.

Oppose the conscription of soldiers and coolies.

Seize the weapons of the enemy and turn them on him.

Experience.

1. The party has always concentrated on the primary enemy. At the outbreak of hostilities the party came out with the battle slogan against French imperialism; but upon the Japanese invasion of Indochina, and during the government of the Fascist Decoux, the slogan was against the Franco-Japanese Fascism. After 9 March the slogans were against Japanese fascism.
2. The party followed a policy of solidarity, wide enough in scope to encompass the revolutionary and democratic forces and to lead them in opposition to fascism. The party intentionally dropped the slogan of land partition in order to be in harmony with its allies, especially with the French Democrats of Indochina after the forming of the Viet Minh front.
3. As far as strategy and tactics were concerned, the direction of the party was truly adequate during this period. Upon the arrival of the Japanese in August 1940 the party saw that the enemy would be the French and the Japanese together. The party thus rallied against them the democratic elements of capital, with the workers, the peasants, and the French Democrats of Indochina. The party also knew how to take advantage of the disagreements between the French and the Japanese for the sake of the revolution.

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The party also knew how to use skillfully every means to advance the movement rapidly. When the various organizations were siding with imperialism, the party at once organized undercover security committees, and at the time of the Japanese surrender formed military groups which were directed by the Committee of Liberation. These groups became the people's committees and then the Administrative Committees. All aspects of the struggle, including strikes which changed into guerrilla action, were utilized. The party also divided some of the conquered land among the agricultural workers, or destroyed rice warehouses like that at Bac Giang. Before the period of the uprising the application of propaganda as well as armed demonstrations replaced the old methods of propaganda, which had less effect. When the situation allowed such activities, the party did not hesitate to create a people's army.

4. The party was able to absorb the methods of scientific organization, and was sufficiently farsighted to keep its organization intact despite ruthless oppression from the Franco-Japanese Fascists, to continue the struggle.
 5. Our party has fulfilled one of its essential duties relative to the support of the USSR against Fascism, following the pledge made by the Communist International. We fight against the French and Japanese Fascists which are a wing of German Fascism.
 6. The party thoroughly prepared the military uprising and had gathered military experiences since its foundation, so that during the period of its first struggles, the party could profit in the large scale military struggle.
 7. Our party closely protected the unity of the party, opposing the tendencies of the right, and the formation of cliques.
- e. The August Revolution and the Resistance of 1945.

The August Revolution broke out at the right time and won just and well earned success. But in taking over power for the first time, we encountered many difficulties. On 30 September 1945, the French colonialists started the assault on South Viet Nam under cover from British troops. At the same time the Chinese Nationalists were disarming the Japanese above the 16th parallel, bringing with them a whole unit of traitors, destined to sow disorder among our ranks. After this France maneuvered with the United Nations to replace the Chinese, while we were just forming our government, not having had the necessary time to fortify ourselves. Our leader, with the agreement of the Central Committee, decided on the 6 March agreement to gain time. Our president went to France to continue the discussions already under way, but the bad faith of the French had become too obvious. We therefore signed the modus vivendi of 14 September 1946, to gain time as we prepared to fight. The French provoked us constantly and became more insolent every day. Contrary to the agreement made, they attacked us at Haiphong and in the capitol (Hanoi). On 19 December we started the attack to protect ourselves, for we know very well that if we failed to attack them, we would soon be surrounded. From that date on the total fight of the whole country began.

The present policy of the party was as follows:

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Unification of all the people, extended resistance: our aim is to completely liberate the nation and to promote the regime of the new democracy. Our task is to promote the resistance and to reconstruct the country. Still, between the two tasks, the victorious resistance is the more important. The Central Committee also came out with the slogan: All for victory. Marshal both the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces of Indochina. The primary enemy is the reactionary French colonialists. The secondary enemy is the traitors, friends of the French.

The direct allies are all classes of the population except the traitors, similar movements throughout the world and the colonial liberation movements.

Indirect allies are the disagreements between the traitors and the French, between the traitors and themselves, and between the French and the Americans.

Establish the enlarged united front: Viet Minh and Lien Viet.

The principal slogans:

Hunt down the French colonialists.

Throw over the puppets.

Vietnam completely united and independent.

Laos and Cambodia completely liberated and separate states in the Indochinese Union.

Rally all the people for the resistance and reconstruction.

Sabotage the economy of the enemy and develop our own.

Increase production for our own subsistence.

Stick to the lowering of the land dues.

Banish illiteracy.

Foster civilization and education in our new democracy.

Spread patriotism in order to insure immediate success of the resistance.

After the battles in the north (1947) a flow of enthusiasm spread all over the country. The leader and the Central Committee launched the patriotic emulation movement to pass over to the second stage of the resistance.

During this period of resistance the party and all the people made progress in all directions, thanks to the calculated policy of the party which had merited the confidence of the people. The party progressed with more speed than ever before. The Cambodian and Laotian sections of the party had just been organized.

Such questions as dialectical education, shaping of personality, reform of working methods, formation of new cadres and the improvement of the old ones, were given consideration by the party. The question of organization methods was also on the

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order of the day, although it still is in its first stages.

Summing up the experience of this first period the following can be stated:

The August uprising was tactically an accomplishment of the first order.

The unification policy advocated by the leader and the party proved useful, and already was bearing fruit.

The party directed the resistance properly and profited greatly by the war.

The achievement of personnel organizations, of correcting its own mistakes, the change of the working methods, all aided the party in obtaining more results.

The launching of the patriotic emulation drive paid off in time and helped speed up the resistance and reconstruction.

The subject of the new democracy was brought up on time.

It is natural to point out negative aspects such as:

The party has failed to pay any attention up to now to the subject of agrarian reform among the ethnic minorities of Cambodia-Laos, and to the dialectical subjects.

CONCLUSION:

We have studied the policy of the party from its beginning up to date. We find that despite certain negative points of detail, the party has closely followed the method and path of Bolshevism.

This path has been followed faithfully, for the party adhered to the dialectical method handed down by the Marx-Lenin doctrines and applied in Indochina.

We have the directives at hand, the method of tactical instruction and the road to follow. The tactics of the party were instituted according to the following points:

- a. Always seek out allies.
- b. Locate the main enemy to be fought.
- c. The party knows very well that it cannot succeed with its advance guard alone, but also needs the effective support of the population.
- d. Once the goal is fixed, one dare not lose one minute, nor lose confidence in the face of setbacks, but one must be determined to go to the final goal.

To change the strategy means at times to change certain aspects of the struggle, of directives, propaganda and activities depending on the fluctuations of the struggle. Yesterday, before the Japanese coup d'etat, we left the rice warehouses intact, whereas today we destroy them.

The party has acquired valuable lessons thanks to the experience, and is qualified to carry out the following tactics:

- a. Know when to advance and when to retreat at the right time, so that you evade the enemy who is waiting to strike. Take immediate advantage of the moment to strike mortal blows at the enemy.

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- b. Change the organization and directives according to the progress or regression of the movement.
- c. Know how to apply the policy key-note in the chain of events; consolidation of strength calls for quick decisions.

When the Japanese perpetrated their coup d'etat the party wanted to lead the population to take part in the battle, and employed as the key-note "destroy the warehouses" in order to lead the movement progressively towards the general uprising.

In other words, the party has made great efforts to become a "Bolshevist" party.

- a. Study the doctrine of Marx and Lenin and know how to apply it to the situation in Indochina.
- b. Observe the people closely, guide them, and study their self-initiated actions.

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